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Abstract
Part I of this Article considers the effects of a treaty expressly covering only those investments
that are made in accordance with host state law. In such cases, the legality of the investment, with
respect to the host state law, is shown to be a jurisdictional prerequisite. Part II discusses the presence of an implicit obligation that an investment must accord with host state and international legal
principles in order for the claims related to that investment to be admissible. Part II also attempts
to clarify some confusion among recent cases as to the nature of this obligation. Part III examines
certain exceptions to the preclusion of a claimant’s claims based on its illegal investment. The
exceptions discussed in Part IV include where the claimant’s illegality is the result of a good faith
mistake and where the host state, knowing of the illegality, condoned the claimant’s investment.
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INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, foreign investors are aware of the legal
protections afforded to their investments under international
law, including under investment treaties. Such legal protections
provide investors with important means of ensuring the safety of
their investments from the wrongful acts of the state in which the
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White & Case, or its clients.
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investments are made. Typically, investment treaties require host
states to: provide a foreign investor with fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security in relation to its
investment; restrict the host state from directly or indirectly
expropriating the investment unless done for a public purpose,
in a nondiscriminatory manner, in accordance with due process,
and accompanied by fair compensation; and disallow
discrimination based on nationality.' Of particular importance,
investment treaties allow investors of the home state to arbitrate
disputes directly with host states for violations of the treaty.2 This
form of recourse deviates from the traditional avenue where a
foreign investor must seek diplomatic protection from their
home state to address wrongs committed by the host.
There are, however, certain circumstances under which
foreign investors are not permitted to pursue their claims against
the state. As such, investors must meet certain basic jurisdictional
(and admissibility) prerequisites. For instance, the investor must
have made a qualifying "investment" under the investment

1. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The PoliticalEconomy of a BilateralInvestment Treaty, 92
AM.J. INT'L L. 621, 631 (1998). For information on bilateral investment treaties ("BITs")
generally, see RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BIlATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
(1995).

2. See Vandevelde, supra note 1, at 632; see, e.g., 2004 MODEL BIT: TREATY BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF
[COUNTRY] CONCERNING THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND RECIPROCAL PROTECTION OF

http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
available at
24,
art.
INVESTMENT,
U.S.%20model%20BIT.pdf [hereinafter 2004 US MODEL BIT] (Indicating that an
investor of the home state may submit the dispute to arbitration "[i]n the event that a
disputing party considers that an investment dispute cannot be settled by consultation
and negotiation."); INDIAN MODEI. TEXT OF BIPA: AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
[COUNTRY] FOR THE 1'ROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS, art. 9(3) (2003),
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/Indiamodelbit.htm ("Should the Parties fail to agree
on a dispute settlement procedure provided under paragraph (2) of this Article or
where a dispute is relerred to conciliation but conciliation proceedings are terminated
other than by signing of a settlement agreement, the dispute may be referred to
Arbitration."); GERMAN MODEL TREATY 2008: TREATY BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY AND CONCERNING THE ENCOURAGEMENT ANi) RECIPROCAL PROTECTION OF
available at http://ita.aw.uvic.ca/documents/200810(2),
art.
INVESTMENTS,
GermanModelllT.doc ("If the dispute cannot be settled within six months of the date
on which it was raised by one of the parties to the dispute, it shall, at the request of the
investor of the other Contracting State, be submitted to arbitration. The two
Contracting States hereby declare that they unreservedly and bindingly consent to the
dispute being submitted to one of the following dispute settlement mechanisms of the
investor's choosing. . . .").

2011]

COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW REQUIREMENT

1475

treaty3 and must also demonstrate that it is a national of the
home state party to the investment treaty under which it is
pursuing its claim(s).
This Article focuses on one such prerequisite, which is
increasingly at issue in recent investment arbitrations-that is,
the legality of the investment in question. It has become
commonplace for respondents to allege that investors have not
complied with the law in making their investment, and
accordingly, should be prevented from pursuing their claims.
Under international investment law, there is an emerging
principle requiring compliance with the law of the host state, and
at times international legal principles, in order to be granted the
substantive legal protections provided by an investment treaty.
The requirement that only investments made in accordance
with the law be protected under an investment treaty can either
be explicit in an investment treaty, such as in the definition of
"investment," or based on general principles of law, it can be
read as an implicit obligation-each carrying with it a different
consequence. It is the latter development that is particularly
important. The lack of clarity with respect to the emerging
implicit obligation for investments to accord with the law may
leave investors, states, and tribunals with an uncertain
understanding as to when the substantive protections of an
investment treaty should be denied to an investor.
Part I of this Article considers the effects of a treaty expressly
covering only those investments that are made in accordance
with host state law. In such cases, the legality of the investment,
with respect to the host state law, is shown to be a jurisdictional
prerequisite. Part II discusses the presence of an implicit
obligation that an investment must accord with host state and
international legal principles in order for the claims related to
that investment to be admissible. Part II also attempts to clarify
some confusion among recent cases as to the nature of this
obligation. Part III examines certain exceptions to the preclusion
of a claimant's claims based on its illegal investment. The
exceptions discussed in Part IV include where the claimant's
illegality is the result of a good faith mistake and where the host

3. Investment treaties will often define a covered "investment."
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the claimant's

INVESTMENT TREATIES WITH "INACCORDANCE
WITH THE LA W" PROVISIONS

Provisions requiring that investments be made "in
accordance with the law" are frequently included in investment
treaties to ensure the legality of investments. Contracting parties
may limit consent to arbitration to disputes meeting their
specified characteristics. 4 Though the governing law in
investment treaty arbitration will be international law, i.e., the
relevant treaty and other applicable principles of international
law,5 when assessing whether a particular investment is made in
accordance with the law, investment treaties containing "in
accordance with the law" provisions will often contain a renvoi to
the law of the host state. The tribunal in Fraport AG Frankfurt
Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippinesexplained in
4. See Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/24, Award, 1 125 (June 18, 2010), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
Hamesterv.GhanaAward.pdf ("[I]t is clear that States may specifically and expressly
condition access of investors to a chosen dispute settlement mechanism, or the
availability of substantive protection. One such common condition is an express
requirement that the investment comply with the internal legislation of the host State.
This condition will typically appear in the BIT where this is the instrument that contains
the State's consent to ICSID arbitration."); see also Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic
of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, 1 184 (Aug. 2, 2006),
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documenLs/Inceysa Vallisoletana-cn_001.pdf.
5. The applicability of international law to investment disputes is often expressly
contained in investment treaties. See, e.g., Energy Charter Treaty art. 26(6), Dec. 17,
1994, available at http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user.upload/document/EN.pdf
(requiring tribunals to consider "applicable rules and principles of international law");
2004 US MODEL BIT supra note 2, at art. 30 (providing that the tribunal shall decide
investment disputes "in accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules of international
law"). Where the dispute is submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Centre for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"), Article 42(1) of the ICSID
Convention requires tribunals to decide disputes in accordance with applicable "rules of
international law," if no selection to the contrary is made. See Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States art.
42(1), Mar. 18. 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]; see also MTD
Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7,
86 (May 25, 2004), http://ita.1aw.uvic.ca/documents/MTD-Award.pdf;
Award,
Camuzzi International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/2, Decision
132-33 (May 11, 2005), http://icsid.worldbank.org/
on Objections to jurisdiction,
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestlype=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC510
En&caseld=CIO.
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relation to the "in accordance with the law" provision being
considered in that case: "[t]he [bilateral investment treaty
("BIT")] is, to be sure, an international instrument, but its
Articles ... effect a renvoi to national law, a mechanism which is
hardly unusual in treaties .... A failure to comply with the
national law to which a treaty refers will have an international
legal effect." 6
Similarly, the tribunal in Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine stated
that, "l[t] he requirement in Article 1(1) of the Ukraine-Lithuania
BIT that investments be made in compliance with the laws and
regulations of the host state is a common requirement in modern
BITs." 7
The tribunal in Desert Line v. Yemen acknowledged the "well
traversed" and "quite familiar" nature of "in accordance with the
law" provisions, maintaining that they exclude investments
"made in breach of fundamental principles of the host State's
law, e.g., by fraudulent misrepresentations or the dissimulation of
true ownership." 8 One way in which an investment treaty can
accomplish this objective is to define the term "investment" as
referring only to assets "accepted in accordance with the
respective laws and regulations of either Contracting State,"9 or
"in conformity with the hosting Party's laws and regulations." 0
6. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Serv. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID
Case No. AR1/03/25, Award, 394 (Aug. 16, 2007), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
FraportAward.pdf.
7. Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on
jurisdiction, 1 84 (Apr. 29, 2004), 20 ICSID Rev. 205.
8. Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17,
Award,
11
104-05
(Feb.
6,
2008),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestlypc=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC79 1En&caseld=
C62; see L.E.S.I. S.p.A et ASTALDI S.p.A v. Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3, Decision,
I 83(iii) (July 12, 2006), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FronServict?requestTypc=
CasesRH&actionVal=showl)oc&docld=I)C528 Fr&cascld=C48 ("[La mention que fait
le texte A la conformit6 aux lois et raglements en vigueur ne constitue pas une
reconnaissance formelle de la notion d'investissement telle que la comprend le droit
alg6rien de maniare restrictive, mais, sclon une formule classique et parfaitement
justifice, I'exclusion de la protection pour tous les investissements qui auraient 6
effectuds en violation des principes fondamentaux en vigueur.").
9. Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the
Philippines for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 1, Apr. 18,
1997, 2108 U.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Germany-Philippines BIT].
10. Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of
Turkey Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 2, Mar.
16,
1995,
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/
pakistanturkey.pdf. For similar language, see Treaty Between United States of America
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This requirement, however, can also be found in other sections
of the investment treaty."
An investment treaty containing such a clause expressly
requires that only investments made in accordance with hoststate law fall within the jurisdiction of a tribunal deciding a claim
under that investment treaty.' 2 Ultimately, the primary aim of any
"in accordance with the law" provision is "to prevent the Bilateral
Treaty from protecting investments that should not be protected,
particularly because they would be illegal."' 3
One example of a case where a tribunal denied jurisdiction
over a claimant's claims due to the investment's failure to accord
with the laws of the host state is Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v.
Republic of El Salvador. In that case, the tribunal found that based
on the language of the BIT and its travaux prdparatoires,"the will
of the parties to the [El Salvador-Spain] BIT was to exclude from
the scope of application and protection of the Agreement
disputes originating from investments which were not made in

and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection
of Investment, Nov. 14, 1991, available at http://www.uncLad.org/sections/dite/iia/
docs/bits/argentina-us.pdf; Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection
of Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic, Apr. 29, 1991, 2242 U.N.T.S. 224.
11. See Christina Knahr, Investments "in Accordance with Host State Law," in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW IN CONTEXT 27, 27 (August Reinisch & Christina

Knahr eds., 2008) (noting that "in accordance with the law" clauses are often included
as part of the definition of investment or in provisions regarding the protection or
admission of investment); e.g., Germany-Philippines BIT, supra note 9, art. 2(1) ("Each
Contracting State shall promote as far as possible investments in its territory by investors
of the other Contracting State and admit such investments in accordance with its
Constitution, laws and regulations . . . .").
12. See Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award, 1 115
(July 14, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/Fakes-v-Turkey.Award.pdf (noting that
if the investment was not "established in conformity with the Respondent's laws and
regulations" according to the definition of the term investment in the applicable BIT,
"the Contracting Party cannot be deemed to have given its consent to arbitrate the
dispute under . . . the BIT ....

).

13. Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4,
46 (July 23, 2001), http://italaw.com/documents/SaliniDecision on jurisdiction,
English.pdf. Another ICSID Tribunal has stated that: "the obligation upon the host State
to admit an investment by a foreign investor (i.e., in the present context, to allow the
purchase of shares in a local company) only arises if the purchase is made in compliance
with its laws." Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award,
1 204 (Mar. 17, 2006), http://www.pea-cpa.org/upload/files/SAI.CZ%20Partial%
20Award%20170306.pdf.
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accordance with the laws of the host State." 14 The tribunal
further found that the claimant had fraudulently misrepresented
itself in a bidding process for government contracts. As a result,
the tribunal determined that it had no jurisdiction over the
dispute because Inceysa's investment did not meet the BIT's
requirement of legality.' 5
Of note regarding the Inceysa case, rather than focusing on
Salvadoran-enacted law in assessing the compliance of the
investment with the law of the host state as expected, the tribunal
directed itself back to international law.16 The tribunal
determined that "the BIT, as valid law in El Salvador, is the
primary and special legislation this Tribunal must analyze to
determine whether Inceysa's investment was made in accordance
with the legal system of that Nation."' 7 In assessing the legality of
the investment in accordance with the BIT, the tribunal noted
that the BIT "does not contain substantive rules that permit a
determination whether Inceysa's investment was made in
accordance with the law of El Salvador," 8 but that its reference
to "generally recognized rules and principles of International
Law"' 9 required the tribunal to look to such principles to assess
whether the investment was legally made. This is to say, the
tribunal found that the host state law to which the BIT directed
it, in turn required the tribunal to look to generally recognized
rules and principles of international law. As such, in denying
jurisdiction over the claimant's investment, the tribunal found
that the claimant had violated the principle of good faith,21 the
14. Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26,
Award,
195
(Aug.
2,
2006)
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Inccysa_
Vallisoletana_cn_001.pdf; see id. 1 208 ("The Tribunal having decided that the consent
given by the Kingdom of Spain and the Republic of El Salvador excludes investments
not made in accordance with the laws of the host State, it must determine whether the
investment that generated the dispute raised before it was made in accordance with the
laws of . .. El Salvador, and in order to determine thereafter whether this Tribunal is
competent or not to hear the dispute submitted to it.").
15. Id. 335.
16. Id. 11 224-27.
17. Id. 220. The tribunal found that the BIT comprised part of Salvadoran law
based on Article 144 of the Political Constitution, which affirms that "international
treaties concluded by El Salvador with other States or international institutions are
considered laws of the Republic upon their entry into force . . . ." Id.1 219.
18. Id. 1 223.
19. Id. 1 224.
20. Id. 11 230-39.
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principle of nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans (i.e.,
nobody can benefit from his own wrong),21 international public
3 The
policy,22 and the prohibition of unlawful enrichment.
tribunal in Inceysa could just as easily have found that the
investment's procurement through fraudulent means violated
Salvadoran domestic law against fraud (assuming such a law
exists) and as such was precluded from the protection of the BIT.
In another case, Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services
Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines, the tribunal determined
that "the BIT explicitly and reiteratedly required that an
investment, in order to qualify for BIT protection, had to be in
accordance with the host state's law. . . ."24 The claimant was
found to have "knowingly and intentionally circumvented the
[Anti-Dummy Law] "-a domestic law limiting a foreign investor's
operation,
in
the management,
ability to intervene
administration or control of a Philippine public utility.25 As a
consequence, the claimant could not "claim to have made an
investment 'in accordance with law"' and so the tribunal found
that it "'lack[ed] jurisdiction rationemateriae."'26
It should be noted that the Fraport award was recently
annulled on grounds that the claimant was not given the right to
be heard on certain evidence that came to light only after the
close of the proceedings.2 7 Nonetheless, the annulment decision
does not take away from the tribunal's interpretation of the "in
accordance of the law" clause in the applicable BIT, or the
consequences of a finding that the claimant breached Philippine
law in making its investment. 8

21. Id. 11 240-44.
22. Id. 11 245-52.

23. Id. 11 253-57.
398. The applicable BIT in that case
24. Fraport, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25,
defined "investment" as "any kind of asset accepted in accordance with the respective
laws and regulations of either Contracting State...." Germany-Philippines BIT, supra
note 9, art. I.
25. Fraport, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, 401.
26. Id.
27. See Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Serv. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil.,
219, 247
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on the Application for Annulment,
(Dec. 23, 2010).
112 (the Annulment Committee finding that the tribunal's
28. See id.
interpretation of the "in accordance with the law" requirement was "not untenable.").
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More recently, the tribunal in Alasdair Ross Anderson et al. v.
Republic of Costa Rica rejected the claimants' claims on the basis
that the investment in question did not comport with the law.29
In that case, 137 Canadian nationals brought claims against Costa
Rica for alleged violations of the Canada-Costa Rica BIT relating
to their investment made through the Villalobos brothers, who
were involved in a currency exchange operation. The applicable
BIT between Canada and Costa Rica defined "investment" as
"any kind of asset owned or controlled either directly, or indirectly
through an enterprise or natural person of a third State, by an
investor of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other
Contracting Party in accordance with the latter's laws . . . ."30 The
tribunal found that Villalobos brothers had breached the
Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica by engaging in
financial intermediation without authorization." As such, the
tribunal concluded that because "the transaction by which the
Claimants obtained ownership of their assets ... did not comply
with the requirements of the [law;] ...

the Claimants did not

own their investment in accordance with the laws of Costa Rica,"
and that the tribunal was "without jurisdiction to hear and
decide the Claimants' claims."3 2 In reaching this conclusion, the
tribunal noted that "Costa Rica, indeed any country, has a
fundamental interest in securing respect for its law."" The
tribunal also commented that "prudent investment practice
requires that any investor exercise due diligence before
committing funds to any particular investment proposal" and
that "[a]n important element of such due diligence is for
investors to assure themselves that their investments comply with
the law," which the tribunal found was "neither overly onerous
nor unreasonable." 34
These three cases, Anderson, Fraport, and Inceysa, maintain
that where an investment treaty expressly requires that
29. Anderson et al. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/3,
Award (May 19, 2010), http://ialaw.com/documenLs/AndersonvCostaRicaAward
19May2010.pdf.
30. Id. 1 46 (emphasis added).
31. Id. 55.
32. Id. 1 57, 59.
33. Id. 58; see id. 1 53 ("The assurance of legality with respect to investment has
important, indeed crucial, consequences for the public welfare and economic well-being
of any country.").
34. Id. 1 58.

1
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investments be made in accordance with host state law, the
parties have decided that only such investments are covered by
that investment treaty. Of course, there are certain issues
regarding the scope of such clauses that cannot be generalized
and can only be determined based on the specific wording of the
investment treaty.35 For instance, most investment treaties only
require an investment to comply with host-state law at the time of
its making.3 6 Occasionally, certain investment treaties only
require compliance with the host state's domestic laws governing
the admission of investments. 3 7 For the most part, however, faced
with an "in accordance with the law" requirement in the
applicable investment treaty, a tribunal must assess whether the
investment in question was made in compliance with the hoststate law in order to find that it has jurisdiction over the claims
related to that investment.
II.

THE OBLIGATION TO MAKE AN INVESTMENT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW WHERE NO SUCH
PROVISION IS PRESENT

Many investment treaties do not contain an "in accordance
with the law" provision. In cases based on investment treaties
35. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatics, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 115
331, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
U.N.T.S.
conventions/ lI_1969.pdf (explaining that treaties must be interpreted according to
the ordinary meaning of the terms in their context and in light of the object and
purpose).
36. See, e.g., Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/24, Award, 1 127 (June 18, 2010), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
Hamesterv.GhanaAward.pdf ("Article 10 legislates for the scope of application of the
BIT, but conditions this only by reference to legality at the initiation of the investment.
Hence, only this issue hears upon this Tribunal's jurisdiction . . .. Thus, on the wording
of this BIT, the legality of the creation of the investment is a jurisdictional issue . . . .").
As the tribunal in Hamester added, "[1]egality in the subsequent life or performance of
the investment . . . may well be relevant in the context of the substantive merits of a
claim brought tinder the BIT." Id.; see Fraport,ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, 345 ("the
effective operation of the BIT regime would appear to require that jurisdictional
compliance be limited to the initiation of the investment. If, at the time of the initiation
of the investment, there has been compliance with the law of the host state, allegations
by the host state of violations of its law in the course of the investment, as a justification
for state action with respect to the investment, might be a defense to claimed substantive
violations of the BIT, but could not deprive a tribunal acting under the authority of the
BIT of itsjurisdiction.") (emphasis added).
37. See, e.g., Fakes v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award,
115, 119 (July 14, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/FakesvTurkeyAward.pdf.

2011]

COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW REQUIREMENT

1483

where the parties have not expressly required that the investment
in question comply with host-state law, the legality of the
investment is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. A tribunal should,
however, consider whether there is a general principle of law that
nonetheless requires a consideration of the investment's
compliance with the law at the merits phase.38
In this regard, it is helpful to consider the decision of Plama
ConsortumLtd. v. Republic of Bulgaria,an arbitration arising under
the Energy Charter Treaty ("ECT").3 9 In Plama, the tribunal
noted that the ECT does not include a provision calling for the
investment's conformity with a given law. 4() The lack of such a
provision, however, does not suggest that ECT's protections
would apply to "all kinds of investments, including those contrary
to domestic or international law." 4 ' According to the tribunal,
the ECT, upon its adoption, was designed to be applied and
interpreted in line with "generally recognized rules and
principles of observance, application and interpretation of
treaties . ... "42 Thus, the claimant's misrepresentation in
obtaining approval for the purchase of a Bulgarian entity came
with consequences. Not unlike the Alasdair tribunal's rationale
that any country has an interest in securing respect for its laws,
the tribunal in Plama determined that denying substantive ECT
protections to investments made against the law furthers the
ECT's general goal of "strengthen [ing] the rule of law on energy
issues." 43 The lack of an "in accordance with the law" provision
did not preclude the tribunal from analyzing the legality of the
38. General principles of law are considered to constitute part of international law.
See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1) (c), available at http://www.icjcij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=2&p3=0 ("The Court, whose function is to
decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall
apply: ...
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations...."). See
generally BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW As APPiLIED BY INTERNATIONAL

COURTS AN) TRIBUNALS (Cambridge University Press 2006) (1953).
39. Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24,
Award (Aug. 27, 2008), http://italaw.com/documens/PlamaulgariaAward.pdf.
40. Id. 138.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing Energy Charter Secretariat, Chairman'sStatement at Adoption Session,
17 December 1994, The Energy Charter Treaty and Related Documents: A Legal
Framework for International Energy Cooperation 157-58 (2004)).
43. Id. T 139 (citing Energy Charter Secretariat, An Introduction to the Energy Charter
Treaty, The Energy Charter Treaty and Related Documents: A Legal Framework for
International Energy Cooperation 13-14 (2004)).
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investment in assessing the admissibility of the claimant's claims
in relation to that investment. Rather, the tribunal concluded
that "the substantive protections of the ECT cannot apply to
investments that are made contrary to law."44
Interestingly, unlike in cases where the applicable
investment treaty has an "in accordance with the law" clause, the
tribunal in Plama did not limit its assessment of the investment's
legality with respect to host-state law, but also assessed the legality
of the investment under international law. Even in Inceysa, where
the tribunal considered the legality of the investment under
international legal principles, it only did so because it
determined that Salvadoran law incorporated a reference to such
principles. The approach adopted in Plama follows logically given
that the applicable substantive law included international law. 45
In this regard, questions may arise as to non-state actors being
the subjects of international legal obligations; such a
requirement, however, is not unusual. 46 Specifically in the
investment law context, requiring that foreign investors be
subjected to basic international legal principles when they are
themselves asserting international legal rights against the host
state is hardly unreasonable.47
In Plama, the claimant's investment was deemed to be "in
flagrant violation" of Bulgarian and international law.48
Specifically, the claimant in Plama shrouded its investment so
that "it was simply a corporate cover for a private individual with
limited financial resources" and its deliberate concealment
amounted to fraud and calculated inducement.4 " The tribunal
determined that the investment was obtained through deceptive
and fraudulent misrepresentation that ran contrary to
44. Id. 1 139 (citations omitted).
45. See Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 5, at art. 26(6) (requiring tribunals to
apply "applicable rules and principles of international law").
46. For an extensive list of eases where non-state actors are subject to international
law, see generally jordan J. Paust, Nonstate Actor Participationin InternationalLaw and the
Pretenseof Exclusion, 51 VA.J. INT'L. L. 977 (2011).
47. Generally in international arbitration, claimants have been required to comply
with transnational public policy in both the commercial and investment treaty context.
See Carolyn B. Lamm, Hansel T. Pham & Rahim Moloo, Fraud and Corruption in
InternationalArbitration, in LIBER AMICORUM BERNARDO CREMADES, 699, 706-11 (M. A.
FerniAndez-Ballesteros & David Arias eds. 2010).
48. See Plama, ICSI) Case No. ARB/03/24, 15 135, 137.
49. Id. T1 133, 135.
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international legal principles. Granting ECT protections to the
investment would violate the principle of nemo auditur propriam
turpitudinem allegans, as well as the basic notions of international
public policy.(o By failing to provide the host state with necessary
information for obtaining approval of the investment, the
claimant's conduct was also deemed contrary to the principle of
good faith, an element of both Bulgarian and international law.51
As such, the investor could not be granted the substantive
protections under the treaty.5 2
The approach of the Plama tribunal is consistent with the
clean hands doctrine-a general principle of law that should be
applicable in all cases.5 3 The "in accordance with the law"
requirement effectively disqualifies claims made by investors with
unclean hands vis-A-vis that investment. As the Alasdair tribunal
noted, the expectation that investors should exercise due
diligence to ensure their investment's compliance with the law is
not an onerous or unreasonable requirement.5 4
Similarly, in the recent Yukos-related arbitrations under
the ECT against Russia-resulting from the same set of
jurisdiction and admissibility proceedings in The Hague-the
respondent argued that the claimants' claims should not be
admitted as a result of its unclean hands.5 5 Though the tribunal
found that the claimants had made a covered investment
50. Id. 1 143.
51. Id. It 135, 144.
52. Id. 1 146.
53. See generally Rahim Moloo, A Comment on the Clean Hands Doctrine in
International Law, I TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. (2011). The clean hands doctrine as
defined by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice is: "[hle who comes to equity for relief must come
with clean hands." Thus, a state that is guilty of illegal conduct may be "deprived of the
necessary locus standi injudicio for complaining of corresponding illegalities on the part
of other States, especially if these were consequential on or were embarked upon in
order to counter its own illegality-in short were provoked by it." GERALD FITZMAURICE,
92 RECUEIL DES COURS 119 (1957) (citations omitted).
54. Anderson v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/3, Award,
1 58 (May 19, 2010), http://italaw.com/documcnts/AndcrsonvCosaRicaAward
19May20I0.pdf.
55. Hulley Enters. Ltd. (Cyprus) v. Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 226, 1
435 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), http://italaw.com/documents/H ELvRussianFederationInterimAward-30Nov2009.pdf; Veteran Petroleum Ltd. (Cyprus) v. Russian Federation,
PCA Case No. AA 228, 1 492 (Perm. Ct. Arb., 2009), http://italaw.com/documents/
Yukos Universal Ltd. (Isle of
VPLvRussianFederation-InterimAward-30Nov2009.pdf;
Man) v. Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 227, 1 436 (Perm. Ct. Arb., 2009),
http://italaw.com/documents/YULvRussianFederation-InterimAward-30Nov2009.pdf.
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according to the express terms of the ECT, and as such that it
had jurisdiction, the tribunal acknowledged that allegations
relating to the claimants' unclean hands would need to be
determined at the merits phase,5 6 perhaps with an impact on the
admissibility of the claimants' claims. The tribunal decided not to
"dispose of the issues argued by Respondent concerning the
'unclean hands' of Claimant and Claimant being an
instrumentality of a 'criminal enterprise,' which it will address
during any merits phase of this arbitration."5 7
A recent case, Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v.
Republic of Ghana, appears to take a position consistent with that
articulated herein. In Hamester, the tribunal found that,
independent of the text of the treaty:
[A]n investment will not be protected if it has been created
in violation of national or international principles of good
faith; by way of corruption, fraud, or deceitful conduct; [] if
its creation itself constitutes a misuse of the system of
international investment protection under the ICSID
[International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes] Convention[;] [or] if it is made in violation of the
host State's law.58
The tribunal made clear that "I[t]hese are general principles
that exist independently of specific language to this effect in the
Treaty."5 9 The applicable BIT in that case, however, contained an
express provision requiring compliance with the laws of the host
state at the time that the investment is made. For the purposes of
deciding on its jurisdiction, the tribunal ultimately found that the
respondent "ha[d] not fully discharged its burden of proof" in
relation to the alleged fraudulent conduct of the claimant as it
related to the initiation of the investment.60 As such, the tribunal
found that it had jurisdiction over the dispute and that any
56. Hulley, PCA Case No. AA 226, 1 435; Veteran Petroleum, PCA Case No. AA 228,
492; Yukos Universal, PCA Case No. AA 227, 1 436.
57. Hulley, PCA Case No. AA 226, 435; Veteran Petroleum, PCA Case No. AA 228,
492; Yukos Universal, PCA Case No. AA 227, 436.
58. Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/24, Award, 1 123 (June 18, 2010), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
Hamesterv.GhanaAward.pdf (citing Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/06/5, Award, 106 (Apr. 15, 2009) ("States cannot be deemed to offer access
to the ICSID dispute settlement mechanism to investments not made in good faith.")).
59. Id. 1 124.
60. Id. 1 131-32.
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fraudulent conduct taking place after the initiation of the
investment would bear on the merits of the dispute.6'
Though confirming the implicit obligation to comply with
host-state law, the Hamester tribunal did not go so far as to
expressly require compliance with international legal principles,
as a general matter, but only focused on certain aspects (as noted
above), such as the principle of good faith. In this regard, any
knowing violation of international legal norms, in fact,
contravene principles of good faith. Illegally made investments,
including those made in violation of any applicable substantive
international legal obligation, should be denied protection. This
denial of treaty protection should be applied equally, for
example, to claims based on violations of international human
rights norms as to claims based on investments procured through
deceitful conduct. From the perspective of denying protection
under an investment treaty, there is no good reason to prioritize
one violation of the law over another. As such, tribunals should
not permit an investor the ability to profit from an investment
that it made in contravention of the law in some cases but not
others. 62
In Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, the tribunal also
affirmed the principle that investments made in contravention of
the laws of the host state cannot be protected by a BIT (though it
did not expressly comment on the issue of illegality under
international legal principles).63 In that case, the Israel-Czech
Republic BIT expressly included an "in accordance with the law"
provision and the question of compliance with host-state law was
not at issue. Nevertheless, citing Plama, the tribunal added that
the requirement of conformity with host-state law "is implicit
even when not expressly stated in the relevant BIT," 6 4 noting that
61. Id.1 138.
62. See Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/26, Award, T 244 (Aug. 2, 2006) http://ita.aw.uvic.ca/documents/
InccysaVallisoletanaen_001.pdf ("No legal system based on rational grounds allows
the party that committed a chain of clearly illegal acts to benefit from them."); see Plama
Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, 11 141-43
(Aug. 27, 2008), http://italaw.com/documents/PlamaBulgariaAward.pdf (finding that
there exists a general principle of law where "nobody can benefit from his own wrong").
63. Phoenix Action, Lid. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award,
91101 (Apr. 15, 2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FronLServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC1033_En&caseld=C74.
64. Id.
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"States cannot be deemed to offer access to the ICSID dispute
settlement mechanism to investments not made in good faith." 6
This requirement should be interpreted as applying equally to
any dispute resolution mechanism contemplated by the
applicable investment treaty, whether under the auspices of
ICSID or otherwise.
The tribunal then went on to comment:
There is no doubt that the requirement of the conformity
with law is important in respect of the access to the
substantive provisions on the protection of the investor
under the BIT. This access can be denied through a decision
on the merits. However, if it is manifest that the investment
has been performed in violation of the law, it is in line with
6
judicial economy not to assertjurisdiction.@
Such commentary, however, appears to blur the line of when the
legality of a claimant's investment is a question of jurisdiction
and when it is a question of admissibility. In the case of explicit
references to the "in accordance with the law" requirement,
tribunals must look to the BIT to evaluate the investment's
legality as a jurisdictional question.67 For example, in Inceysa, the
applicable BIT included an "in accordance with the law"
provision and the tribunal made its decision on jurisdictional
grounds: "because Inceysa's investment was made in a manner
that was clearly illegal, it is not included within the scope of
consent expressed by Spain and the Republic of El Salvador in
the BIT and, consequently, the disputes arising from it are not
subject to the jurisdiction of the Centre." 68

65. Id. 1 106; see also Hamester, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, 1 123 (quoting Phoenix
Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic).
66. Hamester, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, 11 102, 104.
67. See, e.g., Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.$. v. Islamic Republic of
110 (Nov. 15, 2005),
Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Decision on jurisdiction,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestTypc=CasesRH&actionVal=
showDoc&docId=DC523_En&caseld=C27 (concluding that no compelling argument
was present to find illegality of the investment and that nothing in the claimant's actions
relative to the investment could "oust the Tribunal's jurisdiction in the present case");
see also Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Serv. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, 11 335, 356, 398, 401 (Aug. 16, 2007) (finding the
tribunal did not have jurisdiction because the claimant's investment had not been made
in accordance with Philippine law, as required by the Germany-Philippines BIT).
68. Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26,
Award, 257 (Aug. 2, 2006).
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On the other hand, where there is no explicit "in
accordance with the law" limitation in the applicable investment
treaty-the instrument of consent to arbitration-to cover only
those investments that comport with host-state law, such a
limitation cannot be jurisdictional in nature. For instance, in
Plama, a case where there was no explicit "in accordance with the
law" reference in the investment treaty, the tribunal found that it
had jurisdiction, 9 but that the claimant's claims were
inadmissible under the applicable law. Thus, the lack of an "in
accordance with the law" provision in the ECT signified no
jurisdictional requirement of such a nature. Rather, the
consequence of the claimant bringing forth its claims, premised
on an illegally made investment, ultimately rendered those claims
inadmissible.7 1
In this regard, investment tribunals should be careful not to
impose an "in accordance with the law" requirement at the
jurisdictional phase where the applicable investment treaty does
not contain an explicit "in accordance with the law" clause. 7'
Rather, where no such clause is present, the only way that the
investment's failure to comport with the law should serve as a bar
to an investor's claims is on grounds of inadmissibility.72 Whereas
a jurisdictional challenge is a plea that the tribunal lacks

69. Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24,
Decision on jurisdiction, 1 229 (Feb. 8, 2005) http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=)C52 IEn&caseld=
C24. The claimant's illegality did not affect the Energy Charter Treaty's scope of
consent, but rather, served as an equitable defense to the claimant's ability to bring
claims before the tribunal. Id. ("As the Arbitral Tribunal has already stated ... the
Respondent's allegation of misrepresentation by the Claimant does not deprive the
Tribunal ofjurisdiction in this case. Nevertheless, these assertions by the Respondent
are serious charges which, the Tribunal will have to examine on the merits.").
70. See generally id.
71. See Hamester, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, 1 127 (June 18, 2010),
http://ita.aw.uvic.ca/documents/Hamesterv.GhanaAward.pdf
(limiting
its
jurisdictional analysis based "on the wording of [this] BIT.").
72. For the difference between jurisdiction and admissibility, see generally, Jan
Paulsson, jurisdictionand Admissibility, in GLOBAL REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW,
COMMERCE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 601 (Gerald Aksen et al. eds., 2005). Stefan
Talmon, Article 43, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A
COMMENTARY 977 (Andreas Zimmermann Ct al. eds., 2006); see id. at 1029 ("Preliminary
objections may be based on three different grounds: lack ofjurisdiction, inadmissibility
of the application, or any other objection of a preliminary character. Neither the Court
nor the parties have always made a clear distinction between [sic] the various grounds. It
is, however, important to make such a distinction . . . .").
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competence to decide on any issue in the case whether related to
the merits or to the substantive admissibility of the claim, 73 an
admissibility challenge is a plea for the tribunal to dismiss the
substantive claims on a basis other than on the merits of those
claims. 74 To be clear, an investment treaty tribunal does not
reach the question of admissibility until it has found that it has
jurisdiction.7 5 Denying jurisdiction on grounds that do not
concern the scope of the parties' consent renders any resulting
award vulnerable. As Jan Paulsson has described, "[m]istakenly
classifying issues of admissibility as jurisdictional may . .. result in
an unjustified extension of the scope for challenging awards, and
frustrate the parties' expectation [s] .... "76
As such, the finding made by the Phoenix Action tribunal that
any investments performed in "manifest" violation of the law
should fail at the jurisdictional stage is questionable.7 7 If an
investment treaty does not limit its coverage to investments that
accord with either domestic or international law, then it cannot
be said that the parties have consented to limit the tribunal's

73. See 2 GERALi) FITZMAURICE, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL

COURT OF JUSTICE 438-39 (Grotius Publications Ltd. 1986) ("[A]n objection to the
jurisdiction of the tribunal . .. is a plea that the tribunal itself is incompetent to give any
ruling at all whether as to the merits or as to the admissibility of the claim."); Christian
Tomuschat, Article 36, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A
COMMENTARY 589, 646 (Andreas Zimmermann ct al. eds., 2006) (noting "[U]urisdiction
is geared to the basic requirement of consent by the litigant parties").
74. See FITZMAURICE, supra note 73, at 438 (commenting that an admissibility
challenge "is a plea that the tribunal should rule the claim to be inadmissible on some
ground other than its ultimate merits") (footnotes omitted); Tomuschat, supra note 73,
at 646 (maintaining that "admissibility touches upon other requirements which may
result either from the application of general rules of international law (e.g., exhaustion
of local remedies in instances of exercise of diplomatic protection) or from specific
agreements between the parties concerned (e.g., referral of a particular class of disputes
to arbitration)").
75. See, e.g., SGS Sociat6 G6n6rale de Surveillance S.A.v. Republic of the Phil.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on jurisdiction, 1154 (Jan. 29, 2004),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSI)/FrontScrvlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=
showDoc&docld=DC657_En&caseld=C6 ("This impediment, based as it is on the
principle that a party to a contract cannot claim on that contract without itself
complying with it, is more naturally considered as a matter of admissibility than
jurisdiction."); see also Paulsson, supra note 72, at 607.
76. Paulsson, supra note 72, at 601.
77. See Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award,
1 104 (Apr. 15, 2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&doc)d=DC 1033_En&caseld=C74.
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jurisdiction in this respect.78 As such, any decision by the tribunal

not to proceed to the substantive merits of a claimant's claims
due to the illegality of the investment would be a question of
admissibility. Indeed, in such an instance, the tribunal would not
be saying that it is not competent to decide the dispute, but that
there is an important substantive reason for why the claimant's
claims are being dismissed.
The tribunal in the recent case of Toto Costruzioni Generali
S.P.A. v. Republic of Lebanon likewise identified the requirement
to make an investment in accordance with the law as a
jurisdictional prerequisite where no explicit requirement in this
regard can be found in the applicable investment treaty.79
Interestingly, however, this decision, relying on Phoenix Action,
suggests that the requirement to make an investment in
accordance with the law is a requirement under the ICSID
Convention (instead of the investment treaty). In this regard,
one may question the Toto tribunal's reading of the Phoenix Action
decision, when it states: "the Tribunal [in Phoenix Action] added
two criteria to have an 'investment' under the ICSID Convention;"
one of which the Toto tribunal said to be "that assets be invested
in accordance with the laws of the host state."8 0 The ICSID
Convention establishes facilities, i.e., the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes, for the arbitration and
conciliation of investment disputes between Contracting States
and nationals of other Contracting States, and Article 25 of the
ICSID Convention articulates the jurisdiction of the Centre.8 ' As
such, where an investment treaty provides for the resolution of
disputes under the treaty to be referred to ICSID, the

78. See NIGEL BIACKABY, CONSTANTINE PARTASIDE, AlAN REDFERN & MARTIN
HUNTER, REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 341 (5th ed. 2009)

("In consensual arbitration, the authority or competence of the arbitral tribunal comes
from the agreement of the parties; indeed, there is no other source from which it can
come. It is the parties who give to a private tribunal the authority to decide disputes
between them; and the arbitral tribunal must take care to stay within the terms of its
mandate.").
79. See generally Toto Costruzioni Gencrali SP.A. v. Republic of Leb., ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/12, Decision on jurisdiction (Sept. 11, 2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlct?requestTypc=CasesRH&actionVal=showl)oc&docld=
DCl 191 _En&caseld=C104.
80. Id. 1 85 (emphasis added).
81. ICSID Convention, supra note 5, at art. 25.

1492 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 34:1473

treaty and
jurisdictional requirements of both the investment
82
met.
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention must be
The tribunal in Phoenix Action, like the tribunal in Plama,
found that "this condition-the conformity of the establishment
of the investment with the national laws-is implicit even when
not expressly stated in the relevant BIT."83 The tribunal did not
suggest that an investment must accord with the host-state law as
part of the assessment as to whether it satisfied the test under
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. As the Report of the
Executive Directors on the ICSID Convention makes clear, the
ICSID Convention does not define the term "investment"8 4 and
though some tribunals have identified certain criteria that must
be met in order for an investment to come within the scope of
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention,8 5 there appears to be a trend
away from limiting a tribunal's jurisdiction based solely on the
reference to "investment" in the ICSID Convention.8 6 Consistent
82. See Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. The Slovak Republic, ICSID Case
No.
ARB/97/4,
Decision
on
jurisdiction,
1 68 (May 24, 1999),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=
showDoc&doclI=DC556_En&caseld=CI60 ("A two-fold test must therefore be applied
in determining whether this Tribunal has the competence to consider the merits of the
claim: whether the dispute arises out of an investment within the meaning of the
Convention and, if so, whether the dispute relates to an invesuent as defined in the
Parties' consent to ICSID arbitration, in their reference to the BIT and the pertinent
definitions contained in Article I of the BIT."); see also RuDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH
SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw 60-62 (2008).

83. Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award,
101 (Apr. 15, 2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FronServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DCI 033_En&cascld=C74 (emphasis added).
84. INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, Report

of the Executive Directorsof the InternationalBank for Reconstruction and Development on the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States,
in ICSID CONvENTION, REGUIATIONS ANI) RULES 1 27 (2006) ("No attempt was made to
define the term 'investment' given the essential requirement of consent by the parties,
and the mechanism through which Contracting States can make known in advance, if
they so desire, the classes of disputes which they would or would not consider submitting
to the Centre.").
85. See, e.g., Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, It 50-58 (July 23, 2001), http://italaw.com/
documents/Salini-English.pdf; joy Mining Mach. Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/1 1, Award on jurisdiction, 1 42-63 (Aug. 6, 2004).
86. See Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic ofTanz., ICSID Case No.
312 (July 24, 2008), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
ARB/05/22, Award,
FrontServlet?requestTypc=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=
DCl589_En&caseld=C67; see alsoJulian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning of "Investment":
ICSID's Travaux and the Domain of InternationalInvestment Law, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 257,
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with this position, the tribunal in Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey
recently noted, "the principle[] of... legality cannot be
incorporated into the definition of Article 25(1) of the ICSID
Convention without doing violence to the language of the ICSID
Convention."8 7 That tribunal explained, "the expressions 'legal
investment' or 'investment made in good faith' are not
pleonasms, and the expressions 'illegal investment' or
'investment made in bad faith' are not oxymorons. "88
Somewhat ironically, the tribunal in Toto itself references
the lack of a definition or criteria for an investment anywhere in
the Convention. Citing the case of Biwater Gauff v. United Republic
of Tanzania, the tribunal emphasized that the ICSID Convention
should not be interpreted as providing a "fixed or autonomous
definition of 'investment' that must prevail in all cases."89 Rather,
the tribunal found that "[investment criteria] do not appear in
the ICSID Convention. On the contrary, it is clear from the
travaux prdparatoiresof the Convention that several attempts to
incorporate a definition of 'investment' were made, but
ultimately did not succeed."9 0
From the above discussion it appears that certain tribunals
after Plama, though relying on that case, have confused the
nature of the requirement that an investment must be made in
accordance with the law. Where the applicable investment treaty
does not expressly limit its scope to investments that are made in
accordance with the law, such a requirement should be imposed
only as a barrier to admissibility of the claimant's claims. In this
instance, the "in accordance with the law" assessment at the
257 (2010) (advocating for a less restrictive interpretation of the term "investment" in
the ICSID Convention); see generally Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN BHD v. Gov't of
Malay., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for Annulment (Apr.
16,
2009),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSI)/FroniServlet?requestType=CasesRH&
actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC 1030_En&caseld=C247 (annulling an award where the
tribunal had denied jurisdiction solely on its interpretation of the term "investment" in
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention without taking into account the definition of the
term "investment" as defined in the BIT-the instrument of consent).
87. Fakes v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award, 11 112, 115
(July 14, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/Fakes-vTurkeyAward.pdf.
88. Id.
89. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania)Ltd., ICSID Case no. ARB/05/22, 1 315.
90. Toto Costruzioni Generali S.P.A. v. Republic of Leb., ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/12, Decision on jurisdiction, 1 82 (Sept. 11, 2009), http://csid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServiet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=
DCl 191_En&cascld=C104 (citing Biwaterv. Tanzania, 312).
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admissibility phase requires an evaluation of whether the
investment is made in compliance with both host-state law and
international legal principles. In such circumstances, it would be
inappropriate to cloak what is a substantive denial of the
claimant's ability to bring its claims as a decision that the tribunal
is not competent to exercise jurisdiction under the BIT or, for
that matter, the ICSID Convention (in cases where it may apply).
III.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
LAWREQUIREMENT
A. The Exceptionfor "Good Faith"Mistakes

One must consider whether any illegality related to the
investment, no matter how insignificant, should preclude the
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal faced with interpreting an "in
accordance with the law" clause. This question was addressed in
Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, where the respondent alleged that the
claim should be rejected due to defects in documents filed by the
claimant with the respondent in regards to the investment.9 ' The
tribunal was unable to conclude whether the documents
tendered by the claimant were in fact defective, but nonetheless
stated:
Even if we were able to confirm the Respondent's
allegations, which would require a searching examination of
minute details of administrative procedures in Ukrainian
law, to exclude an investment on the basis of such minor
errors would be inconsistent with the object and purpose of
the Treaty. In our view, the Respondent's registration of
each of the Claimant's investments indicates that the
"investment" in question was made in accordance with the
laws and regulations of Ukraine. 92
In coming to this conclusion, the tribunal interpreted the
"in accordance with the law" clause in its context and with the
object and purpose of the BIT in mind, as required by Article 31
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.93 Notably, the
tribunal determined that "the object and purpose of the BIT is to
91. Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18,
jurisdiction, 83 (Apr. 29, 2004), 20 ICSID Rev. 205 (2005).
92. Id. 86.
93. Id. 1 85.
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provide broad protection for investors and their investments."9 4
As such, according to the Tokios tribunal, to exclude jurisdiction
over an investment as a result of "minor errors" would not be
appropriate, even in the face of a requirement in the applicable
investment treaty that investments accord with host-state law.95
The tribunal in Fraportalso addressed the issue of whether
all types of illegally made investments would result in their
exclusion from the jurisdiction of the tribunal. In that case,
however, the tribunal did not use a "minor errors" test, which is
vulnerable to an overly subjective assessment, but rather adopted
a good faith standard. Specifically, the tribunal stated:
When the question is whether the imvestment is in accordance
with the law of the host state, considerable arguments may be made in
favour of construing jurisdiction ratione materiae in a more liberal way
which is generous to the investor. In some circumstances, the law in
question of the host state may not be entirely clear and mistakes may be
made in good faith.96
Explaining what it meant by good faith mistakes, the
tribunal gave some examples:
An indicator of a good faith error would be the failure of a
competent local counsel's legal due diligence report to flag
that issue. Another indicator that should work in favour of an
investor that had run afoul of a prohibition in local law
would be that the offending arrangement was not central to
the profitability of the investment, such that the investor
might have made the investment in ways that accorded with

local law without any loss of projected profitability. This
would indicate the good faith of the investor.97

Based on this explanation, it seems that it would be willing to
exclude good faith mistakes from the "in accordance with the
94. Id.
95. Id. 1 86; see Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/16, Award, 1 297 (Nov. 8, 2010), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal =showDoc&docld=
DCl751_En&caseld=C108 (adopting the minor errors test from Tokios, that tribunal
found: "This Tribunal agrees with the rationale of the tribunal in Tokios in reaching its
own conclusion that Claimant's investment is not excluded from the Tribunal's
,jurisdiction by virtue of alleged defects in Claimant's registration paperwork").
96. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Serv. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, 1 396 (Aug. 16, 2007), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
FraportAward.pdf.
97. Id.
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law" requirement. In that case, however, the tribunal found that
"the comportment of the foreign investor, as is clear from its own
records, was egregious and cannot benefit from presumptions
which might ordinarily operate in favour of the investor."' 8
Following the decision in Fraport, the tribunal in Desert Line
v. Yemen affirmed the "good faith" standard in assessing the
legality of an investment. In Desert Line, the respondent argued
that the claimant had failed to obtain a certificate from the
Yemen General Investment Authority for its investment, and as
such, its investment fell outside of the BIT's scope of protection.
First, the tribunal "d[id] not accept that a particular certificate
from the Yemen General Investment Authority was necessary to
bring the Claimant's investment under the ambit of the BIT."9 9
In any event, in referring to the good faith standard articulated
in Fraport, the tribunal found that "[s]uch leniency would be
appropriate in this case . . . ."100 In the tribunal's view, the fact
that the good faith standard was met in this case was confirmed
by asking the question: "is the likelihood that the investor would
have received a certificate if he had believed it was necessary and
requested

it?"10

The

tribunal

found

that the

answer was

"overwhelmingly affirmative."' 02 The question asked by the Desert
Line tribunal is similar to the Fraporttribunal's assessment that an
investor acts in good faith if it can be said that "the offending
arrangement was not central to the profitability of the
investment" and that if the investment was made in a way that
accorded with the law it would not have adversely affected its
profitability. 103
Though the above cases discuss the exception for good faith
mistakes (or minor errors) where the relevant investment treaties
contained "in accordance with the law" clauses, the same
reasoning applies afortiorito an assessment of admissibility where
no such clause exists. In both instances, good faith mistakes in
relation to the investment should not have the disproportionate
98. Id. 1 397.
99. Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17,
Award, 1 116 (Feb. 6, 2008), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSI)/FrontScrvlct?
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC791 En&caseld=C62.
100. Id. 1 117.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Fraport,ICSI) Case No. ARB/03/25, 396.
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effect of precluding a claimant from the benefits of treaty
protection.
B. Estoppel by the Host Statefrom Raising the Investment's
Illegality
There are certain circumstances where a host state should
be precluded from raising the illegality of the investment to avoid
the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Estoppel, generally viewed as a
principle of international law, is one such circumstance. 0 4
Affirmations or declarations by a state party are binding on it and
entitle reliance by other parties, making it all but impossible for
the state to then reverse those actions or its consequences.105 For
example, in the Eastern Greenland Case before the Permanent
Court of International Justice, the court held that because
Norway had previously "reaffirmed that she recognized the whole
of Greenland as Danish," "she has debarred herself from
contesting Danish sovereignty over the whole of Grcenland." 1o6
In the context of international investment law, where the host
state knew of the illegality but still endorsed the investment, it

104. See IAN BROWNIJE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 153, 643-44
(7th ed. 2008) (noting that estoppel is based on principles of good faith and consistency
and is regularly part of the judicial reasoning of tribunals); CHENG, supra note 38, at
141-42 (" [A] man shall not be allowed to blow hot and cold-to affirm at one time and
deny at another.... Such a principle has its basis in common sense and common
,justice, and whether it is called 'estoppel,' or by any other name, it is one which courts of
law have in modern times most usefully adopted.") (quoting England, Court of
Exchequer: Cave v. Mills (1862) 7 Hurlstone & Norman, 913, 927); see also Pan Am.
Energy LLC v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13, Decision on
Preliminary Objections,
159 (July 27, 2006), http://italaw.com/docIments/
PanAmericanBPJurisdiction-eng.pdf ("Of the essence to the principle of estoppel is
detrimental reliance by one party on statements of another party, so that reversal of the
position previously taken by the second party would cause serious injusticc to the first
party."); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Interim Award, 11 110-12
Uune
26,
2000),
http://
www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/lPope/
PopelnterimMeritsAward.pdf.
105. See Part L.C. MacGibbon, Estoppel in InternationalLaw, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
468, 512 (1958) ("[A] State ought to maintain towards a given factual or legal situation
an attitude consistent with that which it was known to have adopted with regard to the
same circumstances on previous occasions. At its simplest, estoppel in international law
reflects the possible variations, in circumstances and effects, of the underlying principle
of consistency which may be summed up in the maxim allegans contraria non audiendus
est."); see also DO.ZER & SCHREUER, supra note 82, at 6.
106. Legal Status of Eastern GreenlandJ udgment (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No. 53, 1 186 (Apr. 5).
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should be estopped from raising that illegality before the
tribunal.
As the tribunal in Fraport stated: "[p]rinciples of fairness
should require a tribunal to hold a government estopped from
raising violations of its own law as a jurisdictional defense when it
knowingly overlooked them and endorsed an investment which
was not in compliance with its law." 107 In that case, however, the
tribunal found that "a covert agreement, which by its nature is
unknown to the government officials who may have given
approbation to the project, cannot be any basis for estoppel." 1 8
The tribunal in Desert Line confirmed the principle endorsed by
Fraport, noting that, "[i] t would offend the most elementary
notions of good faith, and insulting to the Head of State, to
imagine that he offered his assurances and acceptance [of the
investment] with his fingers crossed, as it were, making a
reservation to the effect 'that we welcome you, but will not
extend to you the benefits of our BIT with your country.'""
Similarly, an affirmative statement by the government
ratifying the actions of the investor may lead a tribunal to
conclude that there was no violation of the law in the first
place."(o In this regard, the tribunal in Inmaris Perestroika Sailing
Maritime Services GmbH v. Ukraine denied the respondent's
contracts comprising claimant's
argument that certain
investment did not accord with the law where Ukrainian
representatives had stated, prior to the commencement of the
107. Fraport,ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, 346; see R.R. Dev. Corp. v. Republic of
Guat., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, Second Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction,
11 146-47 (May 18, 2010) (citing Fraport in rejecting Respondent's argument that
Claimant's investment was not made in accordance with the law because "'principles of
fairness' should prevent the government from raising 'violations of its own law as a
jurisdictional defense when [in this case, operating in the guise of FEGUA, it] knowingly
overlooked them and [eflectively] endorsed an investment which was not in compliance
with its law"').
108. Id. 347.
109. Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17,
119 (Feb. 6, 2008), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
Award,
requestTypc=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC79 1_En&caseld=C62.
110. See, e.g., Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16,
Award, 1 302 (Oct. 20, 2010), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
(the
requestTypc=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=)C 1751_En&caseld=C108
tribunal finding that the extension of certain contracts was not illegal given that the
extensions "had received the explicit approval of the State Tourism Administration."
This finding was irrespective of the fact that the terms of those same contracts "must be
reformed").

2011]

COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW REQUIREMENT

1499

arbitration, that the contracts in question "are valid.""' The
tribunal found that while it "need not go so far as to rely on this
statement under the formal rubric of estoppel" the statement
made by the respondent indicated that "Respondent did not at
that time consider those contracts (or the payment scheme
contained in them) to be illegal under Ukrainian law."" 2
CONCLUSION
It appears clear that where the applicable investment treaty
contains a clause requiring the investment to be made in
compliance with host-state law, such a requirement is a
jurisdictional prerequisite. If parties consent to exclude the
application of an investment treaty to investments that do not
accord with host-state law, a tribunal cannot defer the question of
the investment's legality to the merits.
On the other hand, where parties do not expressly exclude
investments that are not made in accordance with the law from
the investment treaty's coverage, to preclude jurisdiction of the
dispute would be to limit jurisdiction in a way not contemplated
by the parties. This is not to say that a claimant whose claims are
premised on an investment that does not accord with the law
should be able to pursue its claims. Indeed, as cases have rightly
articulated, there is a substantive obligation to make one's
investment in accordance with the law. In its administration of
justice, an arbitral tribunal should not lend its support to a
claimant whose claims arise from an investment which was not
legally made under the law of the host state or international legal
principles. Concerns in this regard become a question of
admissibility for the claimant's claims, i.e., a claimant whose
investment was not made in accordance with the law should be
precluded from its substantive claims being heard even though
the tribunal has jurisdiction over the dispute. In the interest of
judicial economy, it may be efficient for a tribunal to decide on

IlI. Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Mar. Serv. GrnbH v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/8, Decision on jurisdiction, 1 140 (Mar. 8, 2010) http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=
DC1490_En&caseId=C320.
112. Id. The tribunal noted that "this is not a case such as Fraport v. Philippines
(cited by Respondent), in which the facts that rendered the investment illegal under the
host state's law were hidden from the state." Id.
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questions of jurisdiction and admissibility in the same
proceeding. 1 3 Nevertheless, in certain circumstances it may be
necessary to defer the question of admissibility to the merits
phase where more facts must be established to assess the validity
of the claims." 4
"In accordance with the law" clauses, found in many
investment treaties, are most-often limited to requiring
compliance with host-state law. However, there may be a case
where a tribunal faced with an "in accordance with host-state
law" clause finds that it has jurisdiction, but also finds that the
claimant's claims are inadmissible due to the investment's noncompliance with international legal principles.' ' Though such
an argument has yet to be explored by a tribunal, it appears
theoretically possible by following the logic adopted by the Plama
tribunal, and, to an extent, the Hamestertribunal.
Further, most investment treaties limit the "in accordance
with the law" requirement to compliance with the law at the
initiation of the investment. This makes sense given that the
entirety of an investment procured or initiated through an illegal
act is tainted by that illegality. That is, the investor's hands are
unclean with respect to the entirety of the investment. For the
same reason, in assessing the admissibility of a claimant's claims,
the "in accordance with the law assessment" should also be made
with respect to the initiation of the investment in question.
Illegalities arising at some later stage of the investment may have

113. See, e.g., Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, UNCLOS, Award on jurisdiction and
1 65 (Aug. 4, 2000), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
Admissibility,
FrontScrylet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=
(deciding
ViewAnnouncePDF&AnnouncementTypc=archive&AnnounceNo=7_1 O.pdf.
that because the tribunal "lacks jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the dispute
brought by Australia and New Zealand against Japan" that it "does not find it necessary
to pass upon questions of the admissibility of the dispute").
114. See, e.g., 1ulley Enters. Ltd. (Cyprus) v. Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA
http://italaw.com/documents/
2009),
CL.
Arb.
1 435 (Perm.
226,
HELvRussianFederation-InterimAward-3ONov2009.pdf; Veteran Petroleum Ltd. (Cyprus) v.
Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 228, 1 492 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009),
http://italaw.com/documens/VLvRussianFederation-InterimAward-30Nov2009.pdf;
Yukos Universal Ltd. (Isle of Man) v. Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 227, 1 436
http://italaw.com/documcnts/YULvRussianFederation2009),
(Perm. Ct. Arb.
lnterimAward-30Nov2009.pdf (deferring an assessment of the claimant's alleged
unclean hands and its consequences to the merits phase).
115. Such a scenario is unlikely given that any applicable international legal
principles would likely be reflected somewhere in the host-state law.
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an impact on certain claims based specifically on the illegal
conduct, or on the amount of damages granted for a breach, but
may not deem all of the claims of the investor inadmissible.
There may be an instance, however, where, although the
investment is procured legally, illegality pervades the investment
to such an extent that all of the claims are in some way based on
the claimant's illegality. In such a situation, it should be open to
a tribunal to deem all of the claimants' claims inadmissible.
Whether assessing an investment's compliance with the law
as a jurisdictional matter or as a matter of admissibility, a tribunal
should apply two caveats: 1) a good faith mistake in making an
investment should not result in a failure of the investment to
benefit from the protection of an investment treaty; and 2) a host
state should be estopped from raising the investment's illegality if
it knew of the illegality and condoned it. Barring one of these
exceptions, a claimant whose investment is not made in
accordance with the host-state law or international legal
principles should not be permitted to pursue its claims.

